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Abstract 
Smart grids enable customers and utility providers to gain a better understanding of energy consump-
tion and production, by adding a layer of digital data collection and analysis on existing electricity 
grids. As digital infrastructures they have distinct characteristics from earlier ‘pipeline’ infrastructures 
in that they can generate significant network effects that could lead to new opportunities for value cre-
ation across different stakeholders. Exactly because of these unique characteristics of digital infra-
structures, we propose that they can be approached as platforms. With this conceptualization, we seek 
to explore what are the design and value propositions of a digital infrastructure. We provide answers 
to this question by synthesizing existing research on platforms and digital infrastructures. We explore 
the case of the emerging smart grid in South Africa and develop a set of design and value propositions. 
We discuss the relevance of our propositions to extant research on digital infrastructures and plat-
forms, and explore opportunities for further research. 
Keywords: digital infrastructures, platforms, design, smart grid. 
1 Introduction 
Business organizations and government agencies are increasingly required to function in an always-on 
economy, which depends upon the continuous support of various infrastructures, from water supply 
and electricity to computer networking, among others (Dupuy, 2001; Hughes, 1983; Summerton, 
1994). As such, infrastructures can be defined as “the basic physical and organizational structures 
needed for the operation of a society or enterprise, or the services and facilities necessary for an econ-
omy to function” (Tilson, Lyytinen, & Sørensen, 2010, p.748). These can be described as ‘pipeline’ 
infrastructures, usually developed in a linear value chain with emphasis on internal control of re-
sources (both human and technological). Exactly because of this emphasis, pipeline infrastructures are 
usually challenged by tensions of standardization and governance of services (e.g. see Ciborra et al 
2001; Constantinides & Barrett, 2015; Hanseth, Monteiro, & Hatling, 1996; Kee & Browning, 2010; 
Ribes & Finholt, 2009; Tilson et al., 2010). These tensions have a negative impact on the infrastruc-
ture’s ability to scale and to generate value for the various stakeholders involved. 
The advent of the Internet of Things (IoT), enabling interconnections among uniquely identifiable dig-
ital objects via Internet Protocols (IP), as well as enabling larger digital data flows among those ob-
jects (Atzori, Iera, and Morabito, 2010; Rong, Hu, Lin, Shi, and Guo, 2015), has given rise to digital 
infrastructures. Unlike pipeline infrastructures, digital infrastructures are characterized by a pervasive 
ubiquity of digital devices (e.g. smart grid sensors) that open up new possibilities for scale. In contrast 
to pipeline infrastructures, digital infrastructures are managed through a networked value chain, with 
external orchestration of resources and a focus on ecosystem value. Great emphasis is placed on the 
infrastructure itself and the ways it can maximize the total value of its products and services (e.g. 
smart meters and ancillary services) through an iterative, feedback-driven process. For instance, smart 
grids enable distributed power generation, improve the reliability and availability of renewable energy 
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(Futch, 2013), and generate opportunities for “prosumers,” who not only consume, but also produce 
and store electricity (Grijalva & Tariq 2011). 
Exactly because of these unique characteristics of digital infrastructures, we propose that they can be 
approached as platforms. “A platform is a business based on enabling value-creating interactions be-
tween external producers and consumers” (Parker, Van Alstyne, & Choudary, 2016: 5). With this con-
ceptualization, we seek to explore what are the design and value propositions of digital infrastruc-
tures.  
We provide answers to this question by synthesizing existing research on platforms and digital infra-
structures (Section Error! Reference source not found.). Section Error! Reference source not 
found. sets out the method used to examine the case of smart electricity grid in South Africa. Section 
Error! Reference source not found. presents our findings by using the synthesis of the literature to 
develop a set of design and value propositions for digital infrastructures. Section Error! Reference 
source not found. concludes with a summary of our findings, by discussing the relevance of our 
propositions to extant research on digital infrastructures and platforms, and discussing opportunities 
for further research.  
2 Literature review: From Pipeline to Digital Infrastructures & 
Platforms   
Early pipeline infrastructures including transportation, electricity, water, and sewerage were responsi-
ble for rolling out basic services across geographical territories as public or quasi-public goods using 
systems of standardized services (Dupuy, 2001; Hughes 1983; Summerton 1994). These early pipeline 
infrastructures were widely assumed to be integrators of urban spaces (Graham & Marvin, 2001). 
Even with the advent of information infrastructures for telephone, radio, TV and the Internet in the 
20th century the nature of these pipeline infrastructures was a high “concentration of ownership and 
control, the need for mass markets, and a strong regulatory hand further reinforcing industry bounda-
ries and stability” (Tilson et al 2010:749).  
In recent years, the advent of cheaper, smaller and more powerful digital devices has enabled im-
proved communications, storage and processing of information and data, in the process blurring the 
traditional boundaries between industries (Yoo 2010). This blurring of industry boundaries has al-
lowed different stakeholders (e.g. content providers, computing companies, software developers, etc) 
to generate heterogeneous bundles of services on established and new business models. New digital 
infrastructures have emerged, “enabled by lower costs and global reach encouraging wide participa-
tion in service production and distribution … and new market conditions created by multisided mar-
kets” (Tilson et al 2010: 750). 
In technical terms, what distinguishes digital infrastructures from earlier pipeline infrastructures is the 
integrating role of IP, including the added artificial intelligence in monitoring devices and analysing 
data. Through unique addressing schemes and standard communication protocols, these digital infra-
structures connect a variety of physical devices that can interact with each other (Atzori et al, 2010; 
Rong et al, 2015). This also means that digital infrastructures not only connect a specific organization-
al system or linear value chain, but also connect various other stakeholders who consume and produce 
services for their own purposes. 
In economic terms, the transition from pipeline to digital infrastructures means a move from supply to 
demand-based economies of scale. Digital infrastructures mediate transactions across different stake-
holders, generating various network effects (Van Alstyne, Parker & Choudary 2016). “Network effects 
arise when the value one user places on a good depends on how many other people are using it” 
(Shapiro & Varian 1999:45). Network effects can be direct or indirect (Arthur 1994; David 1985). 
Direct network effects (also called same side effects - see Parker et al 2016) explain how an increase 
in usage by one set of participants (e.g. consumers) leads to a direct increase in value for other same-
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side participants (e.g. other consumers).  Indirect network effects (also called cross-side effects – see 
Parker et al 2016) explain how increases in usage of one product or service by a set of participants 
lead to increases in the value of a complementary product or service (e.g. consumers generate effects 
for producers), which can in turn increase the value of the original. Value can be both tangible (e.g. 
financial gains) and intangible (e.g. better information on available products and services). Although 
network effects have also been observed in pipeline infrastructures (see Hanseth 2001), the difference 
now is that digital infrastructures create efficiencies in social networking, demand aggregation, appli-
cation development etc, all of which help networks expand faster, while offering a higher average val-
ue per transaction (Van Alstyne et al 2016). 
Because of these unique characteristics we propose that digital infrastructures can be conceptualized 
as platforms. Research on platforms has focused on market dynamics and competition (e.g. Arm-
strong, 2006; Rochet & Tirole, 2003), as well as architectural design and innovation (e.g. Baldwin & 
Woodard, 2009; Krishnan & Gupta, 2001). We establish links between research on platforms and digi-
tal infrastructures, to identify design and value creation opportunities for different stakeholders. These 
links are summarized in Table 1. 
 
Platform  
functions (Par-
ker et al, 2016) 
Design Principles for Digital 
Infrastructures (Hanseth & 
Lyytinen, 2010) 
Links between the two literatures  
Pull participants 
in the core in-
teraction 
Design initially for direct use-
fulness 
Build upon the existing in-
stalled base 
Both literatures call for a need to attract users and increase 
adoption and participation. Both recognize the importance 
of the installed base.  
Platform research places emphasis on consumer/producer 
expectations on market structure and efficiency.  
Infrastructure research places emphasis on the technical 
design of the infrastructure and user adoption. 
Facilitate further 
interactions 
among partici-
pants 
Expand the installed base by 
persuasive tactics to gain mo-
mentum 
Both literatures call for a need to enable network effects 
across the installed base to gain momentum and achieve 
scalability. 
Platform research places emphasis on the value generated 
by both supply and demand sides of the platform  
Infrastructure research places emphasis on the role of 
standards and gateways in increasing the size of the user 
base.  
Match partici-
pants to markets 
Make IT capability as simple 
as possible 
Both literatures call for a need to make IT capabilities sim-
ple to understand in order to generate new uses. 
Platform research places emphasis on ways by which IT 
capabilities can be recombined to generate new (added-
value) services.  
Infrastructure research places emphasis on the role of ar-
chitectural principles and user interface protocols. 
Modularity Establish a modular architec-
ture, as well as distributed 
governance structures that will 
enable independent interac-
tions between core IT compo-
nents and participants 
Both literatures call for a need to establish stability through 
modularity and governance. 
Table 1:  Platform Functions and Design Principles for Digital Infrastructures 
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2.1 Platform Functions & Design Principles for Digital Infrastructures  
Platforms provide the rules for a marketplace that brings together different stakeholders. These stake-
holders fill four main roles, namely, owners, providers, producers and consumers, but these roles may 
shift rapidly from one to another (Van Alstyne et al 2016). The design of digital infrastructures can 
benefit from this classification of roles and rules of interaction.  
Deciding what the “core interaction” of the platform will be is the first and most important job for de-
signers (Parker et al, 2016). For example, when a smart grid is added as a platform onto an electricity 
grid, it can enable utility companies (as producers) to improve its grid management practices, as well 
as individual customers (as consumers of electricity) to improve their energy use. This may also allow 
municipalities (as providers) and the main electricity producer (as the owner) to better regulate and 
govern interactions between producers and consumers, while achieving transparency for both. In this 
case, the ‘core interaction’ would consist of exchanges between producers and consumers, facilitated 
through better data on supply of, and demand for, electricity (i.e. the value unit of the core interaction), 
data analysis via sensors, and adjustment of cost and services (i.e. the filtering of the core interaction). 
The smart grid could offer this core interaction through a set of capabilities for “pulling” participants 
onto the platform (e.g. by offering incentives to use smart readers), “facilitating” further interactions 
(e.g. offering energy valuations of different appliances in a building), and “matching” participants to 
markets (e.g. matching consumers with producers of energy-efficient appliances). In addition to these 
functions, there is one structural commonality across all observed platforms: that of a modular techno-
logical architecture (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Gawer, 2014; Parker et al., 2016). Below we estab-
lish links between these platform functions and the design principles for digital infrastructures.  
One of the key challenges of digital infrastructure design is the integration, control and coordination of 
increasingly heterogeneous IT capabilities (Constantinides & Barrett, 2015; Hanseth et al., 1996; Kee 
& Browning, 2010; Ribes & Finholt, 2009). On one hand, infrastructure designers have to come up 
early on with solutions that persuade users to adopt while the user community is non-existent or small. 
This requires them to address the needs of the very first users, before achieving completeness of their 
design. This has been called the “bootstrap problem of infrastructure design” (Hanseth & Lyytinen, 
2010). On the other hand, when the infrastructure starts to expand by benefitting from network effects, 
designers need to design for unforeseen and diverse needs. This demands infrastructural flexibility and 
has been described as the “adaptability problem of infrastructure design” (Edwards et al 2007). Five 
design principles that aim to address these two problems have been proposed (Hanseth & Lyytinen, 
2010). These design principles can be linked to the functions of platforms as described above and 
summarized in Table 1. 
The first two design principles proposed by Hanseth and Lyytinen (2010) link to the pull function of 
platforms. The authors suggest that, initially, a small user group needs to be identified and targeted, 
with the proposed IT capability; offering the group immediate and direct benefits, with low design 
costs for the producer and low learning costs for the consumer. IT capabilities should be designed on 
the existing installed base so that the targeted user groups face minimal adoption barriers (e.g. smart 
readers on electricity grid). The notion of an installed base refers to both the existing technological and 
user base upon which a new infrastructure is built and comes from economics (Shapiro & Varian 
1999; Farrell & Saloner 1986). The notion has been used in both platform (e.g. Iansithi & Zhu 2007) 
and infrastructure research (e.g. Hanseth & Lyytinen 2010; Hanseth 2001), with the former placing 
emphasis on meeting customer expectations on market structure and efficiency and the latter on the 
technical design of the infrastructure towards improving user adoption. 
The third design principle is linked to the facilitation function of platforms. As argued previously, af-
ter establishing an initial user base, designers need to think of ways to generate network effects (Roch-
et & Tirole, 2003; Armstrong, 2006; Parker et al 2016). Research on digital infrastructures has also 
noted the importance of network effects, in relation to standards and gateways in particular (Hanseth 
2001). The value of a standard (e.g. a smart meter) defining an IT capability depends on the number of 
Slavova and Constantinides /Digital Infrastructures as Platforms 
 
 
Twenty-Fifth European Conference on Information Systems (ECIS), Guimarães, Portugal, 2017 1221 
 
 
users having adopted it (Hanseth and Lyytinen 2010). The more users adopt a standard the more likely 
that another user will adopt it, which further increases its value and so on (Arthur, 1994; Shapiro and 
Varian, 1999). Whereas infrastructure research tends to focus primarily on user communities (e.g. Star 
& Ruhleder 1996), platform research focuses on both the supply and demand sides of the platform, 
seeking to understand both same side or direct (producers to producers and consumers to consumers) 
and cross-side or indirect network effects (producers to consumers and vice versa) (Parker et al 2016). 
Network effects can also be negative, driving away participants and leading to the collapse of a plat-
form (Parker et al 2016). Like positive network effects, negative network effects can be both direct 
(e.g. decrease in the number of consumers of one service) or indirect (e.g. increase in the costs for 
consumers to use diverse producer services). 
The fourth design principle is linked to the fourth function of platforms and starts to become relevant 
after initial adoption.  Hanseth and Lyytinen (2010:13) argue that “if designers continue to generate 
highly interdependent and local IT capabilities, the whole system will become inflexible and reach a 
stasis.” To avoid such a stasis, the designers need to follow simple architectural principles (e.g. de-
composing service infrastructures into a set of layers, Yoo, Henfridsson, & Lyytinen, 2010) and user 
interface protocols to simplify the functional scope. These principles decrease the technical complexi-
ty of IT capabilities, but more importantly, reduce their social complexity (Tiwana, Konsynski, & 
Bush, 2010). Research on platforms acknowledges these design guidelines, but once again, places em-
phasis on market dynamics (Parker et al 2016). The aim is to recombine existing IT capabilities so as 
to generate new, added value services, enabling platform participants to match their needs to new 
markets (e.g. enabling consumers who generate energy through solar panels to sell their energy to con-
sumers of coal-based energy).  
Finally, the fifth design principle, suggests that infrastructures should be decomposed recursively into 
separate modules. In addition to a modular IT architectural design, modularity should also involve 
governance rules for monitoring interactions between core IT components and participants. Getting 
right the degree of decentralization between the authority and responsibility for each class of decisions 
to be shared among platform owners and module developers is key to implementing good governance 
(Tiwana & Konsynski, 2010). In contrast, when governance weighs too much on either side (too much 
autonomy vs. too much control), participants will tend to feel disengaged and disempowered leading 
to their non-participation on the infrastructure (Constantinides & Barrett, 2015). This design principle 
is also fully supported in platform research (Baldwin & Woodard, 2009; Boudreau & Hagiu 2009).   
In summary, we have established links between research on platforms and the design of digital infra-
structures. We will apply these ideas, as summarized in Table 1, in the analysis of an empirical case 
study of smart grid development in South Africa to derive a set of design and value propositions. In 
the next section we describe our methods, before presenting our findings.  
3 Methodology 
3.1 Setting 
The South African electricity sector remains dominated by the state-owned monopoly of Eskom. Its 
customer segments are predominantly municipal (about 42% of its load), industrial, commercial (e.g. 
mining, agriculture), as well as residential. The increased demand for electricity in the country has 
resulted in extensive ‘load shedding’ practices (i.e. scheduled electricity cuts) and increased electricity 
costs. These problems have led to customer non-payment and electricity theft, especially in low in-
come regions. Developing a smart grid aims at addressing these problems by adding a layer of intelli-
gence onto the existing electricity grid. This allows for the monitoring of supply and demand through 
sensors, making adjustments through appropriate switches, and better educating customers.  
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3.2 Data collection and analysis 
In this research we sought to understand the strategy of designing a smart grid for South Africa, as 
well as the value that can be created from such a strategy. We should note here that, although there is 
both a national strategy, as well as independent municipal initiatives to develop smart grids, so far on-
ly a few pilots have been successful. Drawing on primary and secondary empirical data we develop 
propositions that could help South African stakeholders successfully implement a national smart grid. 
The NRS049 - Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) standard has been drafted to create a specifi-
cation for a national smart grid in South Africa, as shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
Figure 1. Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI) for South Africa’s National Smart Grid 
Source: Eskom (2014) 
We collected primary data through interviews with 21 respondents. This sample includes views from 
(i) innovators in the electricity sector (e.g. Siemens and Schneider Electric); (ii) companies involved in 
broad-based digitisation efforts for which the electricity sector presents a special interest (e.g. IBM, 
SAP); and (iii) connectivity providers (e.g. FastNet, MTN). Table 2 lists all the participants with their 
positions and the companies they represented at the time of data collection. Interviews followed a 
semi-structured format, where the questions were adjusted depending on the company profile. In addi-
tion to the data collected via interviews, the analysis considered the contents of secondary documents 
including case studies, presentations, white paper reports, product catalogues, and user manuals pro-
vided by our interviewees and their companies. These documents were able to provide context to the 
interviews and prepared us to extract better insights (Denzin and Lincoln, 2005).  
 
 Company Respondent No Interviewees roles/positions 
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Siemens 
Eskom 
Eskom 
Eskom 
Accenture 
Schneider 
Electric  
CSIR 
NRG Renew 
Africa 
Respondent 1 
Respondent 2 
Respondent 3 
Respondent 4 
Respondent 5 
Respondent 6 
 
Respondent 7 
Respondent 8 
 
CEO Siemens Smart Grids Africa 
Strategy manager 
Corporate Tech Specialist, Smart Grids and Energy Efficiency 
Smart Grid CoE Manager 
Senior Principal - Accenture Smart Grid Services 
Sales Director Field Services 
 
Research Group Leader 
Chairman 
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SAP  
SAP  
IBM 
Dimension 
Data 
HP 
HP 
Microsoft 
Respondent 9 
Respondent 10 
Respondent 11 
Respondent 12 
 
Respondent 13 
Respondent 14 
Respondent 15 
Director Mining & Metals Industries 
Industry Principal 
Program Director, Software Offering Management 
Chief Solutions and Marketing Officer – Networking 
 
HP Software Country BU Manager 
Director of Strategic Marketing 
Partner Channel Development Manager - Cloud 
D
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tio
n-
 C
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-
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FastNet 
Sentech 
MTN 
Ericsson 
Cisco 
Cisco 
Respondent 16 
Respondent 17 
Respondent 18 
Respondent 19 
Respondent 20 
Respondent 21 
Head: Product Portfolio Management 
Head: Innovation & Solutions 
Senior Manager: Service Delivery - ICT Services 
Head: Government and Industry Relations 
Client executive 
Solution Account Manager Service Sales 
Table 2.  List of interviewees 
We analysed the data seeking to understand how the elements summarized in Table 1 applied in the 
case, and to what outcomes. We examined the relationship between all the elements in Table 1 to de-
velop a set of propositions. These propositions were expressed as case-specific relationships between 
the elements identified in the literature, exploring how their combination can produce particular out-
comes (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). 
4 The case of smart grid in South Africa 
4.1 The Core interaction 
The core interaction between electricity producers and consumers occurring on the South African elec-
tricity grid consists of balancing energy generation (i.e. supply) and load (i.e. demand). Implementing 
a smart grid could facilitate the core interaction by enabling utility companies to balance electricity 
generation and load by adjusting time-of-use pricing. Meanwhile, customers could be offered im-
proved spent management capabilities through real-time pricing transparency, and opportunities to 
contribute through distributed green energy generation capacity. Thus, the key incentive for utility 
companies (as producers) would be to meet electricity demand by using the energy produced most ef-
ficiently, and at costs below price. The key incentive for customers (as consumers of electricity) would 
be to minimize their electricity use at times when the price exceeds their willingness-to-pay. We con-
sider the smart grid as a platform; better data on the supply, demand and cost of electricity as the ‘val-
ue unit’; and ‘filtering’ as achieved through the analysis of data on supply, demand and cost.  
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4.2 Pulling participants in the core interaction 
In our research we sought to understand how the core interaction for digital infrastructures such as 
smart grids could be initially designed for direct usefulness while building on an existing installed 
base (design principles 1 and 2) and whether these design principles could increase the value generat-
ed for consumers and producers. We develop three propositions to understand this relationship (1a, 1b 
and 1c). 
First, initially designing for direct usefulness could be achieved through improved instrumentation of 
the electricity grid in South Africa. Such instrumentation would be directly useful to producers since it 
would enable a number of data-driven processes in the sector. Combining measurements and observa-
bility into the grid, with external information on weather and other adverse events would bring imme-
diate value to producers in terms of improved awareness of its load and its generation structures.  
“We’ve got tools in place that assist the network operator with looking at your grid holistically, so it’s 
a macro view of your grid called grid situational awareness. It tells you exactly what’s happening to 
your grid with a lot of static and dynamic sources that are now being considered.” [Respondent 3, 
Eskom] 
Drawing on the above, we put forward the following proposition: 
1a. Designing for direct usefulness (i.e. monitoring, predictive maintenance, balancing supply and 
demand), can generate direct network effects (i.e. situational awareness) for producers.  
Second, smart meter designs providing customers with usable and transparent interfaces, could en-
courage energy efficient habits among consumers. The earliest residential time-of-use pilot in South 
Africa, was carried out by Eskom in Table View, Cape Town, in 2001.  In a subsequent pilot, Eskom 
improved the interface of smart meters by adding LED lights. Red, yellow and green lights allowed 
customers to monitor continuously their energy consumption and its level of affordability. According 
to the South African Smart Grid Initiative (SASGI), supported by the South African National Energy 
Development Institute (SANEDI), these pilots were followed by the implementation of approximately 
65,000 smart meters in Soweto, Sandon & Randfontein (Johanneburg), in Margate (KwaZulu-Natal), 
Ethekwini (Durban), Msunduzi and Nelson Mandela Bay Municipality, Nala, Naledi, Govan Mbeki, 
Thabazimbi and Mogale City (SAMSET 2015). The smart meters led to considerable changes in be-
haviour. As an Eskom executive put it, introducing “a price signal […] that the market can respond to” 
[Respondent 2, Eskom], improved the usability of the system and the transparency of the incurred 
payment charges. Thus, it improved consumers’ awareness, thereby leading to changes in behaviour.  
“Now the ones that we have worked on the pilot, the thirty thousand we’ve taken through the whole 
theme, they are very positive and in fact they’re already saying ‘well you know Nick’s my neighbour, 
how come he’s using half of what I use. I need to look at what I’m doing.’ So we’ve had sort of a peer 
comparison which has worked extremely well.” [Respondent 3, Eskom] 
In other words, exactly because all smart meters are connected to the smart meter platform, there are 
recommendations on energy prices at different times of the day. As discussed in our first proposition 
above, this could be valuable for the producers in terms of predicting demand, but it could also be val-
uable for consumers because they could budget and manage their energy consumption better. Drawing 
on the examples presented above, we put forward the following proposition: 
1b. Designing for direct usefulness (i.e. clear price signal) can generate direct network effects (i.e. 
energy consumption awareness) for consumers. 
Smart grid implementations superimpose an additional layer of intelligence to the existing electricity 
grid. Thereby, they require connectivity to the existing infrastructure for aggregating and processing 
the data collected at the level of individual customers. Despite this, smart grid implementations have 
struggled with connectivity in the aggregation of data from end points (e.g. consumers’ meters) to cen-
tral data management and control centres. While alternatives abound, ranging from powerline carriers, 
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to radio frequency and mobile network implementations, experience points to preference for IoT im-
plementations. Designs leveraging the existing grid such as, relying on connectivity via powerline car-
riers, have proved ineffective in delivering smart grid benefits.  
However, IoT systems tend to comprise of edge-metering devices, which capture and transmit data 
using proprietary standards, which sooner or later hit an IP address. While previously GSMA stand-
ards and IT standards (e.g. SSL) were very far apart, over recent years standards have increasingly 
converged towards IP. Consequently, we see many GSMA operators also contesting the IoT connec-
tivity space. As there is still a lot of bespoke proprietary equipment that does not adhere to IP-based 
standards, connectivity presents a particular challenge to the technical work of systems integrators. 
“My Samsung fridge at home has got internet connectivity. The chips and the monitoring it does, are 
proprietary to Samsung. [So is] the network they are using to bring back the data to the screen my 
fridge has got a on it. The Internet connectivity component, which breaks it outside of the fridge, is IP. 
The sensor connectivity that it is telling me what the cooling is, that my milk is gone […] that is pro-
prietary. The network back into the sensors over there I have no idea what it is. … if you go outside of 
the purest ICT environments, that is where you find your standards don’t align. It is a big challenge.” 
[Respondent 13, Dimension Data] 
In addition to the technical challenge of standardization, building upon the existing grid also requires 
developing a robust business case to address the needs of both producers and consumers. Convincing 
business cases hinge on identifying measurable value to be derived from the implementation of IoT. 
The key factors which impact the development of business cases for investment in smart grids are 
largely centred round producers’ current cashflow problems, stifled by direct and indirect non-
technical losses. These problems reduce their capacity to invest in devices of sufficient quality for the 
instrumentation of the electricity grid, leading to subsequent increased costs for maintenance, re-
placement and running of the devices. 
“The utilities are cashed strapped as I explained, so they are forced now to go for a lower spec devic-
es because that’s all they can afford. And these lower spec stuff will just last less, that’s the reality of 
things.” [Respondent 6, Schneider Electric] 
Summing up, we find competing strategies of reliance on installed powerline connectivity and reliance 
on innovative IP-based designs. Whereas powerline designs leverage installed connectivity, IoT de-
signs are in better position to deliver the perceived benefits of a smart grid. Nonetheless, they are rife 
with incompatibilities in terms of standards and integration difficulties. In addition, developing robust 
business cases to invest in IoT designs is very challenging for producers, while also affecting consum-
er adoption and use. Drawing on this case material, we make the following proposition: 
1c. Building upon the existing installed base requires extensive standardization (technical interop-
erability) and business case development (pricing), without which adoption and participation cannot 
be achieved.  
4.3 Facilitating further interactions 
A second objective of our research was to understand how digital infrastructures could be designed to 
facilitate further interactions between participants by expanding the installed base and using persua-
sive tactics to gain momentum (design principles 3 and 4), and whether these design principles could 
lead to further value creation. We develop three propositions to understand this relationship (2a, 2b 
and 2c). 
As smart meters are able to provide readings on consumption of other utilities besides electricity (e.g. 
gas), the provision of value-added services is increasingly becoming feasible. Such business cases of-
ten pivot on the provision of ancillary services (e.g. VOIP, Internet, IPTV, water and gas). For exam-
ple, Eskom’s strategy manager (Respondent 2) pointed out that in the smart meter project, conducted 
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in 2012, meters were deployed costing approximately R6500 each. With typical bills of less than 
R1000 per month, for Eskom the rate of return from the capital investment was negative. There was 
not really a business case for the smart meters as such. Yet, there was a business case when ancillary 
services were added to the model. Since then, the technology has matured and the devices have re-
duced in price, costing approximately R2200, thereby strengthening the business rationale for the de-
ployment. Thus, enabling ancillary services on the smart grid could offer opportunities for producers -- 
other than electricity producers (e.g. internet, water and gas) -- to also generate value for the smart grid 
itself, and subsequently for producers of electricity. Drawing on the above we put forward the follow-
ing proposition: 
 
2a. Adding value-added (ancillary) services on the digital infrastructure can generate direct net-
work effects on the supply side (producers to producers). 
In addition, by adding new value-added (ancillary services) on the smart grid can have indirect or 
cross-side network effects, by enabling new interactions between different stakeholders with value 
added services. One example of how the expanded smart grid can generate indirect network effects are 
mechanisms for addressing the cross-cutting problems of urban living, encountered by government, 
utility companies and health services. For example, through a partnership led by the research institute 
CSIR working alongside Eskom and city municipalities they were able to demonstrate the value of 
their smart city platform. Considering the underlying complexity of switching and grid management 
practices, they were able to show added value from smart switching which goes beyond improved grid 
management.  
“So what we are positioning for and what we are doing is, we are allowing for smarter decisions. That 
is ultimately … the main value proposition of IoT, [a] smarter decision…: ‘Control this, don’t control 
this’, or ‘Send this alert because this is happening’.”[ Respondent 7, CSIR] 
The senior manager for service delivery from MTN, a telecoms company, also added on the possible 
added-value services that can be offered by an expanded smart grid: 
“Yes, we can charge a utility company for monitoring geysers. That is something we do. It is a defined 
revenue stream. But what if we could use the data that is coming off […] and sell it to another partner. 
[…] Now who would be interested whether the geyser is leaking or not? Insurance companies… So 
what if we were monitoring a whole lot of geysers across South Africa and accessed the data and we 
could inform the insurance company before the geyser [bursts]?” [Respondent 19, MTN] 
Thus, by enabling new producers to join the smart grid (e.g. insurance companies), new synergistic 
interactions between producers and consumers can develop. Drawing on the above we put forward the 
following proposition:   
2b. Adding value-added (ancillary) services on the digital infrastructure can generate indirect net-
work effects between the supply and demand side (producers to consumers and vice versa).   
While over the years, smart meter designs have improved their usability and their capacity to deliver 
meaningful information to customers (e.g. light indicators, LED panels), designs are not necessarily 
geared towards delivering value to both consumers and utility companies. For example, because of the 
increased infrastructure investments required by utility companies, they are forced to cut down their 
costs by investing in less smart devices. Such devices have limited technical features compared to 
smart devices. One example of such a device is ‘split meters’, which physically separate the meter 
from its display. The design allows utility companies to counteract non-technical loses such as tamper-
ing with the meter and to manage utility pre-payment. Nonetheless, the design does not allow for addi-
tional value (e.g. smart home services) to be captured by consumers who are not able to access the 
meter itself, even though they receive energy consumption information via a display. Some customers 
have complained that this design is an oppressive technology, used for “controlling our energy” [Re-
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spondent 3]. Thus, consumers are dis-incentivized to install these split-unit meters, which can lead to 
negative network effects and decreased participation.  
2c. Barriers to the use of added value-added (ancillary) services on the smart grid, can generate 
negative network effects and decreased participation  
 
4.4 Matching participants to markets 
A third objective of our research was to understand how a digital infrastructure could be designed to 
enable better matching of participants to relevant markets by making IT capabilities as simple as pos-
sible (design principle 3), and whether this design principle could lead to value creation between con-
sumers and producers. We develop two propositions to understand this relationship (3a and 3b). 
The key matching properties of a smart grid are improved measurements and increased degree of ob-
servability into the grid. By improving these matching properties, smart grid deployments are capable 
of enabling, hitherto unachievable, fine-tuned grid management practices. For example, utilities are 
able to engage in load forecasting, load balancing, peak-shaving, outage management, voltage optimi-
sation, optimising network and energy trading, etc.  
“You can now become very clever and you can have arrangements with certain [large] customers that 
they don’t use electricity between certain times […] and you can switch them off. It is called surgical 
data curtailment. And with strategies like that you can manage supply and demand.” [Respondent 1, 
Siemens] 
As electricity customers are increasingly becoming generators of power, for utility companies such as 
Eskom, smart meters could offer an interface not only for selling but also for buying power supply. 
This is especially true for customers who produce alternative energy such as, solar panels connected to 
the electricity grid, enabling them to ‘sell’ energy supply to utility companies, by offsetting their ener-
gy bills. As an extension to this, the introduction of smart meters to more regions in Africa could gen-
erate momentum for value creation across a wider range of customers and utility companies. Schnei-
der Electric, 60% owners of the Durban-based pre-paid and smart meter manufacturer Conlog, exports 
its meters to more than 20 countries. Their smart meters have proved to be adaptable to several stand-
ards including, SABS and ISO standards generating more opportunities for value creation.  
Alternative energy production and improved standardization could enable the creation of independent 
power producers (IPPs) such as, multinationals (e.g. France’s EDF) and commercial customers (e.g. 
mine corporations) to not only generate their own energy, but to also sell it back to Eskom (McDonald 
2012a). Subsequently, Eskom could sell it back to other customers. Drawing on the above we put for-
ward the following proposition: 
3a. Digital infrastructures allowing producers and customers to trade with one another, can gener-
ate direct and indirect network effects for both the supply and the demand side. 
Despite such positive direct and indirect network effects, the vast potential for renewable energy gen-
eration, alongside with relaxed regulation and improved affordability of renewable technologies, has 
led to the evolution of micro-grid models. These allow customers to go ‘off grid’ i.e. to use the main 
electricity grid only as a backup source, adding uneven demand to the challenges of grid management. 
The CEO of Siemens told us: 
“In the old days it was a question of pushing energy on one side of the grid, and just pulling it out on 
the other side, making sure that there is enough. Now energy is flowing in all directions and you have 
to be able to manage that. You have to switch it on and off, and that’s not a trivial activity. But you 
also have to modulate it.” [Respondent 1, Siemens] 
Renewable energy is very difficult to predict and requires accurate weather forecasts.  It also has steep 
rates of change and when extra energy is generated, furthermore it is very expensive to store. Experts 
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estimate roughly that each Megawatt of renewable energy that is added to the grid needs to be offset 
by another Megawatt of controllable load in order to compensate for its variability. All of these factors 
raise the complexity of grid management. Based on this evidence we put forward the following propo-
sition: 
3b. The complexity of managing a range of services on digital infrastructures can generate direct 
and indirect negative network effects between the supply and demand side and decrease participa-
tion. 
4.5 Modularity 
A fourth and final objective of our research was to understand how a digital infrastructure could be 
designed based on a modular architecture with governance structures that can enable independent in-
teractions between core IT components and participants (design principle 5), and whether this design 
principle could lead to value creation. We develop one proposition to understand this relationship. 
Eskom centrally controls the generation and transmission of electricity throughout South Africa, with 
some exceptions for IPPs. Much of the distribution, however, falls in the responsibility of South Afri-
can municipalities, which buy bulk electricity from Eskom for resale. This was a state policy to ration-
alize pricing structures in order to give some autonomy to municipalities to generate income from 
electricity, but also to distribute governance away from Eskom (McDonald 2012a). The role of munic-
ipalities as providers of electricity meant that many of them proceeded to the deployment of their own 
smart meter programs with the help of third party device manufacturers and software developers. In 
this way, modularity was achieved by policy design.  
Modularity in the design of digital infrastructures is very important for better managing vulnerabilities 
and enabling a continuous flow of services to the end consumer. With the help of IoT, faults could be 
identified and measured very precisely. Furthermore the costs of remedying faults could fall consider-
ably as technicians would be able to detect the exact position of the fault. Governance structures 
around who is responsible for identifying and managing a fault could be decentralized according to the 
individual modules or assets. Governance, thus, could become embedded in the digital devices, and 
the smart grid would be able to self-govern itself, informing technicians where there is a fault. 
“By having the data concentrator on the mini-sub and it’s PLC [power line carrier], it [is] self-
discovered. It will look for everything that’s on its lines and connects to it. So automatically you know 
where each meter is installed. The reason for that is if there’s fault finding required, you know exactly 
where the fault lies and where it’s installed.”[Respondent 6, Schneider Electric].  
“[…]The more intelligence you bring in, the more closely you can detect that [you have] a fault, the 
technician can drive to the exact position of the fault, and you can also remediate very very quickly 
because you can cut that piece of line that has caused the short circuit. You can cut it out of the grid 
and you can run the power via other lines.” [Respondent 1, Siemens] 
Based on the above we put forward the following proposition: 
4. By designing digital infrastructures on a modular architecture with decentralized governance 
structures, interactions between core digital components and participants could be stabilized.  
5 Discussion & Conclusion 
This paper established connections between research on platforms and the design of digital infrastruc-
tures. In developing design and value propositions, the paper contributes to a theoretical distinction 
between digital infrastructures and earlier pipeline infrastructures, by placing emphasis on the network 
value generated through demand-side economies of scale by both producers and consumers. This is in 
contrast to earlier research on pipeline infrastructures which focused on internal control of resources 
and supply-side economies of scale. Extant research has only examined the value of IT infrastructure 
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investments (e.g. Kumar 2004), but there has been limited (if any) research examining the direct and 
indirect network effects between producers and consumers and the value generated from their interac-
tions. Only research on value co-creation has examined the value generated through the synergistic 
interactions between different stakeholders through new IT capabilities (e.g. Han et al 2012; Rai et al 
2012). However, even in this research, the emphasis is on producers with little (if any) consideration 
of the role of consumers. Furthermore, the negative effects of value co-creation have not yet been 
explicitly explored in the IT value co-creation literature. Finally, we contribute to research that exam-
ines the complementarities between architectural modularity and governance decentralization (Tiwana 
& Konsynski 2010). Our findings support such complementarities and extend the argument beyond the 
boundaries of a single organization. The combination of ubiquitous connectivity and modularity inher-
ent in a digital infrastructure, enables governance decentralization to be achieved through the distrib-
uted digital devices themselves. This can lead to value extension across multiple stakeholders.  
The paper also has a number of practical implications for the design and implementation of smart 
grids. Although South Africa is far from implementing a national smart grid that could capitalize on 
the value generated from demand-side economies of scale, the few pilots that have been implemented 
show signs of potential success (SAMSET 2015). The biggest challenges for a national smart grid are 
institutional stemming from increased demand growth due to urban population growth, increased elec-
tricity cost, and subsequently non-payment and electricity theft (McDonald 2012b). These challenges 
need to be addressed with policy and pricing reforms, which are beyond the scope of this paper. In 
addition to this, any plans for a national smart grid need to also address the technical challenges of 
poor interoperability and standardization and the business challenges of providing the appropriate in-
centives for different stakeholders to participate on the smart grid.  
The opportunities and challenges of designing smart grids with an emphasis on demand-side econo-
mies of scale are not unique to South Africa.  A recent study by Accenture (2014) analyzed the smart 
grid deployment strategies of 15 countries across Europe, Asia, North and South America, finding that 
all of them faced the same challenges, albeit at different degrees. In this and other studies (Giordano 
and Fulli, 2012; Groh et al 2015) great emphasis is placed on the role of consumers in transforming 
existing models. As Groh et al (2015) argue, “end-users could act as ’prosumers’,” forming the core 
nodes of the smart grid. Giordano and Fulli (2012) also propose that smart grids could be viewed as 
multi-sided platforms – a paradigm shift that could reverse the supplier-led paradigm of the electricity 
sector. Further research could draw on the insights of these studies and our own conceptualization of 
smart grids as platforms to develop a better understanding of the value creation opportunities offered 
by these new digital infrastructures.   
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